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Change in Twentieth-century Epistemology 
Takefumi Toda 
This paper aims to illustrate the change epistemology has undergone in the twentieth 
century. In a previous paper, (!) I explained how the conception of knowledge in modern 
philosophy changed between the times of Descartes and Reid. I showed that the conception of 
knowledge became, by degrees, more flexible and naturalized. Moreover, I suggested that this 
change occurred because of the effect of newly introduced psychological considerations on 
epistemology. In this paper, I will argue that a similar phenomenon occurred in the twentieth 
century as well. 
l. Sense-datum theory 
l believe we can fairly say that Anglo-American twentieth-century epistemology started 
with Russell and Moore. The two phi losophers rebelled against British idealism and adopted 
the methods of empiricists. Moore's way of thinking involved analysing concrete phenomena. 
for example, during a lecture, be told his students to look at a white envelope and their own 
hands, and he then examined what they were in his view. Experiments like this one led him to 
develop the now famous term: sense-data. 
But now, what happened to each of us, when we saw that envelope? I will begin by 
describing part of what happened to me. I saw a patch of a particular whitish colour, 
having a certain size, and a certain shape, a shape with rather sharp angles or comers and 
bounded by fairly straight lines. These things: this patch of a whitish colour, and its size 
and shape I did actually see. And 1 propose to call these things, the colour and size and 
shape, sense-data, th.ings given or presented by the senses-given, in this case, by me 
sense of sight. (2) 
The concept of sense-data, which Moore began to use in an epistemological context was 
adopted by Russell. In fact, it was Russell who led to this concept's spread throughout the field 
of philosophy, and sense-datum theory became a mainstream, widely accepted idea among 
philosophers. As Moore's above quotation suggests, and as many philosophers came to 
acknowledge, sense-datum was thought to give our empirical knowledge a solid foundation. 
This is because sense-datum has a special feature in that its existence is unquestionable. ln 
other words, sense-datum avoids the effects of illusion or hallucination, from which other 
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objects of experience are apt to suffer. for this very reason, many philosophers accepted it as 
the basis of our empirical knowledge. H. H. Price, a representative sense-datum theorist, 
explicitly describes the infallibi lity of sense-datum as follows: 
One thing however l cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat 
bulgy shape standing out from a background of other colour-patch, and having a certain 
visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness. 
What the red patch is, whether a substance, or a state of a substance, or an event, whether 
ii is physical or psychical or neither, are questions that we may doubt about. But that 
something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt .(3) 
Here, we can recognize a similarity between sense-datum theory and the ideas of the great 
modem philosopher Descartes. For example, Price seeks a solid foundation for knowledge that 
has certainty. In addition, other sense-datum theorists seek such a foundation through 
consciousness. However, a key difference between sense-datum theorists and Descartes is that 
the former group finds the basis of ocir knowledge in objects of thei r perception, while 
Descartes found it in the ego. There is another similarity of note between them: in seeking an 
epistemological basis, both sense-datum theorists and Descartes dismiss methods that do not 
reflect consciousness. That is, they do not rely on scientific knowledge at all because they find 
that doing so confuses the order of knowledge systematization. Rather, their aim is to ground 
the scientific system in their es tablished basis. However, sense-datum theorists have 
complicated Descartes' methods. From the beginning, they would ground our empirical 
knowledge in particular objects. Moore continued to consider the relationship between the 
concept of materia l bodies and sense-data, but he could not reach a conclusive answer. 
Sense-datum theory has been exposed to many critiques, and its theorists have tried to 
avoid the implications of the criticism by giving new meaning to their theories. Here, I offer 
the following example. 
Ayer is a sense-datum theorist. However, he fully notes one problem with standard sense-
datum theory. That is, the attempt to give a foundation to empirical knowledge has proven 
futile. In this respect, he cites Hume·s analysis, which he acknowledged as a significant 
influence. Ayer asserts that all empirical statements are hypothetical ones. Their probabili ties 
never reach certainty, and their justifiedness is measured by their consistency with other 
numberless empirical statements, namely, hypothetical ones. Moreover, he stresses that 
empirical statements have pragmatic value. This attitude sets Ayer apart from other sense-
datum theorists. We can recognize both holistic and pragmatic aspects in bis phi losophy, but 
he is neither a holistic phi losopher nor a pragmatist. Since he posits that the mission of 
philosophy is logical analysis , he is best defined as an analytic philosopher. He has asserted 
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that logical analyses of statements require the translation of such statements into other 
statements. Thus, Ayer interprets sense-datum not as factua l, but as linguistic, and tries to 
analyse our ordinary language through sense-datum language. However, the approach Ayer 
takes has also been criticized by many philosophers. J. L. Austin may be his fiercest critic; 
Austin opposes the philosophical dichotomy by emphasizing the great variety of meanings in 
ordinary language. 
2. Analysis of the concept of 'S knows that P' 
The twentieth century is the age in which conceptual analysis developed. As scholars have 
pointed out, Frege and Wittgenstein brought about this trend. Moore and Russell applied the 
method of analysis to empirical phenomena, while Frege and Wittgenstein applied it to our 
language. They recognized language as the limitation of human thought, and therefore tried to 
draw boundaries a round our thoughts by c larifying our conceptions. With this goal , 
philosophers tried to analyse the concept of ·s knows that P'. In doing so, they revisited the 
ideas int roduced by the great ancient philosopher Plato. Plato presented three candidate 
definitions of knowledge in hi s Theatetos: (1) perception, (2) true opinion, and (3) j usti fied 
true opinion. P lato eventually rejected all three of these, but modern phi losophers have 
reexamined them. Sense-datum theorists have paid the most attention to the first, while the 
philosophers I examine in this section focus on the last. 
The twentieth cenmry"s epistcmologists widely agree that the necessary and suffic ient 
conditions for ·s knows P' a re as follows. 
( 1) S believes p. 
(2) P is true. 
(3) S is justified in believing P. 
They then seek to analyse the conception of "justifiedness'. One philosopher who pursues 
this project is R. M. Chisholm. l! is commonly known that Edmund Gettier's article dealt a 
hard blow to the epistemologists who tried to analyse knowledge as justified bel ief. In the 
short, three-page article, Gettier shows that even if the above three conditions are satisfied, we 
do not necessarily have any knowledge about P. Thus, these three conditions are not sufficient 
condit ions of knowledge. Early reactions agains t Gettier·s conclusion tended to offer more 
complex redefinitions of knowledge-conditions. The works of Clark (1963) , Sosa (1964), 
and Lehrer (1964) are the most eminent examples of this. However, in spite of their efforts , 
the new conditions these scholars proposed were often refuted by coun ter examples. 
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We can say tha t the conception of knowledge as justified true beliefs bas already been 
softened when compared to standard conceptions of sense-datum theorists. As previously 
mentioned, standard sense-datum theorists are foundationalists. Moreover, like Descartes, they 
seek certainty through determining the foundation of our empirical knowledge. However, 
justifiedness has a wider meaning that includes not only deduction but also rational ity. We may 
say that someone·s belief on certain epistemic enterprises can be accepted as rational, even if 
there is some possibility of it being erroneous. 
Evidently, phi losophers who think knowledge as justified true beliefs can also adopt the 
strongest criteria for justifiedness. That is , they may only assume belief-propositions are 
justified if they have certainty. However, most philosophers do not appear to take this 
approach. 
Thus, the softening of the conception of knowledge begaD, and, in early responses, some 
thinkers cast doubt on the traditional conceptions of knowledge. For example, Clark writes the 
following: 
I think that the revised definition illuminates the issue as to whether so-called incorrigible 
knowledge is to be counted as knowledge at all. lf I can't ( logically) be wrong, for 
example, as to whether I am in pain, then, it is claimed, it is not properly a question of 
knowledge. For knowing entails having found out, and finding out is something which I 
may fail to do. <4) 
The softening of tbe conception of knowledge docs not stop here. The problem of 
determining what knowledge is continued to change, becoming, at least in part, the problem of 
knowing how knowledge is produced. Naturalism sparked this movement.Cs> 
3. The evolution of naturalism 
In 1967, Alvin Goldman's artic le entitled ·A Causal Theory of Knowledge· introduced a 
direction for epistemology that differs from that discussed in the previous sect ion. In the 
article, Goldman tries to show how beliefs can be justified. He pays specific anention lo the 
causal course by which our beliefs are generated. He admits that perception, memory, and 
inductive reasoning are reliable processes for justifying epistemic beliefs. Then, he suggests 
that examining and clarifying when and how these processes generate the correct beliefs is a 
scientific task. 
His article marked an important departure from analytic philosophy in that his 
epistemological framework gave scientific research a function in epistemology. The role of 
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epistemologists like Goldman is to present frameworks for justification. However, the role of 
epistemology is to present candidates for a nom1ative conception of knowledge. Epistemology's 
concrete mechanisms or contents are then revealed through scientific research. Thus, in 
epistemological research, pbilosophers began to work hand in hand with scientis ts . In his 
celebrated article about naturalized epistemology, James Meffie writes the follow ing: 
Naturalists a re uni ted by a shared commitment to the continuity of epistemology and 
science. Naturalists and non-naturalists divide over whether or not the continuity exists. <6J 
This defini tion interprets the essence of naturalism only loosely. C learly, naturalized 
epis temology encompasses a wide range, and respected artic les provide us w ith some 
classifications of it. (7) According to the authors of these articles, the point on which natural istic 
epistemologists disagree each other is how they pertains to the normative aspect. Each 
epistemologist's position is classified according to how he or she analyses the norms of our 
knowledge. 
The most radica l positioning naturalism is often said to be descr iptive natu ralized 
epistemology, commonly represented by Quine. Q uine, in his seminal article, writes the 
fo llowing: 
Epistemology, or something like it, s imply falls in10 place as a chapter of psychology and 
hence of natural science. It stud.ies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject . 
. . . T he relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we 
are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; 
namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of 
nature transcends any avai I able evidence. <S> 
In this passage, Quine seems to suggest that the role of epistemology is to describe our 
epistemic enterprise, and he seems to leave no room for the nonnative aspect of epistemology. 
ff we adopt this posit ion, we must consider not what our conception of knowledge is , but 
rather how our knowledge is produced. 
It is widely assumed that many epistemologists do not agree on this positio11. In fact, 
Quine himself is said to embrace the normative aspect of epistemology in his later work. This 
assumption seems to be partly right and partly wrong. I will further address this point in a later 
section. 
Regardless of which position we adopt on nah1ralistic epistemology, it is certain that our 
concept of 'knowledge' must be softened. Naturalistic epistemologists do not try to establish a 
foundation that has certainty. Also, unl ike Descartes, they do not consider knowledge to be 
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infallible. 
Here, I want to point out that th is change in the conception of knowledge in the twentieth 
century has something to do with the change that occurred in the modem period. In the modem 
period, Descartes proposed an infallible, cerrain conception of knowledge. Bui British 
empiricists- namely, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid- brought about a gradual softening in 
the conception of knowledge. Though each has a slightly different theory, all take a naturalistic 
approach. They present scientific achievements at the outset, and then build their epistemology 
on these. Additionally, Berkeley, Hume and Reid attempt to justify belief through considering 
our natural constitution. (9) 
ln my earlier article (2010), I noted that this transition occurred with the development of 
psychological studies in the seventeenth century. In particular, Berkeley and Reid vigorously 
tried to show how knowledge was produced. David Hartley, known as a founder of association 
psychology, advanced this line of thinking even farthcr. (to) Of course we must be cautious 
when applying today's classification of philosophy to classical thinkers. But I believe we can 
safely say that their philosophies have some of the same naturalistic features as those of the 
modem era. (lll We can consider the naturalization of epistemology in the twentieth century<J2) 
as the reappearance of the naturalization of epistemology in the seventeenth century. Moreover, 
I want to address an additional similarity between the development of epistemology in the 
twentieth century and that of the eighteenth century: the ways in which psychology affected 
developments in philosophy. 
4. Philosophy and psychology 
Jn spite of Wittgenste in's diagnosis,03l philosophy and psychology have gone hand in 
hand, or have at least influenced each other. For example, in the early twentieth century, 
behaviorism spread in psychology as well as in philosophy. Many analytic philosophers or 
logical positivists adopted behaviorist ideas.04) The area of thought referred to as the 
phi losophy of mind has been influenced by psychology and vice-versa. 
Psychology is one of the empirical sciences and it enjoys the same benefits as other 
natural sciences.us> Psychology has also been changing gradually with the development of 
technology. Though cognitive study has flourished since the mid-twentieth century, it is 
computer science that had the greatest influence on that movement. Goodwin states as follows 
Other events re levant to the cognitive movement took place in disciplines far removed 
from psychology. One of the most critical was the development of computer science, 
which accelerated in the 1940s due to the mili tmy needs of World War II , with its demands 
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for such things as automated radar-tracking sysrems. (16l 
Moreover, the technology for medical imaging devices developed in the 1950s. Positron 
emission tomography (PET) appeared at thac time, and later, in the 1990s, functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRT) also appeared. These devices represented a radical revolution not 
only for medicine but also cognitive sciences. Scientists became able to observe dynamic 
changes of our bodies, especially our brains. This encouraged cognitive scientists to examine 
the connection between our neural networks and various behaviors, including psychological 
ones, which also affected philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind. 
Philosophy ofmiud was one of the most prevalent areas of study in the twentieth century. 
Philosophers tried to overcome the persisting influence of Descartes· dualism. To this end, 
behaviorism, already addressed in this paper, was an early approach. Also, physicalism has 
attractive to many philosophers working between the 1960s and today. The development of 
cognitive psychology has doubtlessly contributed to this trend. Early Australian physicalists, 
philosophers J. J.C. Smart and D. M. Armstrong.ml advocated reductionism, which is idea 
that our mental phenomena can be reduced to physical components or behavior-for example, 
thoughts or behaviors could be reduced to functions of our brains. Besides reductionism, 
physicalism has grea t variety today. However, they all have been profoundly influenced by 
developments in brain science. 
Developments in brain science have led psychologists back to traditional problems of 
philosophy, though psychologists· tasks and goals differ from traditional approaches to 
philosophy of mind. Many cognitive scientists seem to be indifferent to solving the ontological 
problems of the mind- that is, the problem Descartes left to phi losophers. Instead, they mainly 
endeavor to locate our conscious phenomena in specific areas or functions of the brain. (18) 
However if we ignore this point, the border between philosophy and cognitive scientist 
become blurred. In next section, I address the implications of this blurring. 
S. Descriptive epistemology or the philosophy of mind 
Many scholars claim that most naturalistic epistemologists do not agree wilh Quinean 
naturalism. But I do not consider this analysis to necessarily be correct. lf we take it into 
consideration all that has been discussed prior to this section, Quinean epistemology appears 
to be much more widely accepted than scholars assume. 
It is a fact that naturalistic epistemology is not the only option phi losophers have. In 
particular, traditional epistemologists do not accept a naturalistic approach as legitimate 
epistemology. For example, Chisholm, speaking from the internalistic and founda tionalistic 
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view points, states, (19J 
We must be on guard, however, in interpreting contemporary literature that professes to be 
about 'intemalism· or 'externalism'. Some of those authors who profess to view knowledge 
and epistemic justification 'externally' are not concerned with traditional theory of 
knowledge. That is to say, they are not concerned with the Socratic questions, 'What can I 
know?', 'How can I be sure that my beliefs are justified?', and ' How can I improve my 
present stock of beliefs?' (20) 
Chisholm asserts that some epistemologists are not legitimate. Descriptive epistemologists 
are probably among these. But Chisholm's view is not necessarily correct. We can indeed 
consider descriptive epistemologists as genuine. Tb is is not a problem of fact but of definition. 
If some cognitive scientists or phi losophers of mind can be correctly called epistemologists, 
descriptive epistemology is likely much more widely received than some scholars suggest. 
Whether this assumption is correct depends on how well we embrace epistemology. One 
example involves Paul Churchland, a typica l eliminativist who deals with our cognitive 
faculties by means of cognitive science in his The Engine of Reason, The Seat of die Soul: A 
Philosophical Journey into the Brain. This book can unquestionably be categorized as 
belonging to phi losophy of mind. But l argue that it can be also be categorized as descriptive 
epistemology. If this is indeed the case, many tria ls represented by Churchland can be regarded 
as belonging to Quinean epistemology. This is why l assert that the Quinean approach has 
spread much more effectively than is acknowledged. 
Jn any case, the phenomena I describe in this paper reveal how the conception of 
knowledge became softer and more moderate between the early twentieth cenn1ry and today. 1 
suggest that two factors caused this change. The first is the dead lock of traditional 
epistemology and tbe other is the development of cognitive science as accelerated by 
technological advancement. Certainly, some traditional epistemologists may not admit that 
trad itional epistemology has reached a s tandstill. llowever, if we consider natura lized 
epistemology more widely and approach cognitive science as a type of epistemology, it can be 
assumed that epistemology has changed considerably. More specifically, the change shows that 
our epistemological concerns have transferred from what knowledge is to how knowledge is 
produced. 
6. Other aspects of twentieth-century epistemology 
I have shown how the conception of knowledge has softened and epistemology has 
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changed in the twentieth century. But there are additional important changes 10 epistemology 
that T did not mention. These include the socialization of epistemology and the development of 
philosophy of science. These two issues are closely related lo each other. Though I cannot 
discuss them due to lack of space, I will briefly mention them here. 
Since Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scient(fic Revolutions , the debate on what our 
scientific knowledge is has become widely popular. In this celebrated book, Kuhn describes 
how scientific knowledge, which existed under a certain paradigm in an earlier age, shifts. 
When such shifts occur, an old scientific system is replaced by new one. Kuhn suggests that 
there is discontinuity between new and old paradigms and that a scientific system is not 
cumulative. His argument incited many reactions, leading to dispu tes between realist and anti-
realist thinkers. (21) 
In addition, Kuhn's argument caused another change in epistemology: it led to the 
socialization of epistemology. Traditionally, epistemology has paid attention to an individual's 
epistemic status. But Kuhn·s relativistic argument influenced a shift in this traditional view. (22) 
Since the 1980s, many epistemologists and sociologists have begun to take part in this trend of 
examining the social contexts or conditions that provide members of any given community 
with justification. (23) 
These recent developments in epistemology suggest that the nature of the fact has become 
a serious problem. It is often assumed that an individual knows a fact with certainty when that 
person's epistemic enterprise is evaluated or j ustified. If traditional justification conditions-
(1) S believes P, (2) Pis trne, (3) S is justified by believing P- are uses, the evaluator must 
indisputably know a fact. But recent debates have cast doubt on th is assumption. I argue that 
such debates were not seen in modern philosophy, and that they show how of the conception 
of knowledge has been still more radica lly softened. 
7. Conclusion 
I have surveyed the changes that have occurred in twentieth-century epistemology until 
now. These changes pertain to the conception of knowledge. This concept has gradually 
softened while epistemology has been naturalized. A similar change also affected epistemology 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Lastly, there is one other important factor involved in this change that I did not discuss 
fully: the influence of pragmatism. The tradition of pragmatism, furthered by many English-
spcaking philosophers, has certainly influenced changes in epistemology. However, 1 end this 
study here for the time being, and leave pragmatism to be addressed in the future. 
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